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The Southwest’s Uneven Welcome:
Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion
in Arizona and New Mexico
Robin DALE Jacobson, Daniel Tichenor,
T. Elizabeth Durden

Introduction
In few policy areas is the authority of the federal government presumed to be more dominant than immigration. In four phases
during the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court advanced a dictum of
exclusive federal power to regulate the admission and expulsion of non-
citizens. In the century that followed, the Court was consistent and unequivocal in expounding the “plenary power” doctrine that “over no other conceivable subject is the power of Congress more complete.”1 Federal laws
governing immigrant rights have received stricter scrutiny from the courts,
but again federal authority and policy have routinely trumped state and local
regulations. Despite these legal verities, however, states have always played a
pivotal role in governing the inclusion or exclusion of immigrants in American life. State governments preceded their federal counterpart in constructing an elaborate set of regulations controlling immigrant admissions and
rights, actively recruiting new settlers, and building bureaucratic systems
and capacities for inspecting and monitoring new arrivals. An important
and growing literature has begun to highlight the enormous significance
US states play in governing immigration and immigrant rights.2 But our
understanding of how different states have influenced the lives of newcomers
and their families in distinctive ways over time remains remarkably limited.
To understand how states and contrasting regimes govern newcomers,
New Mexico and Arizona from their formation in the Progressive Era to
the Second World War are especially revealing. Today, most immigration observers in the United States readily acknowledge a wide gulf in
the reception and membership rights of immigrant communities in these
two neighboring states. Arizona gained notoriety in 2010 when it enacted
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legislation—SB1070—requiring state and local law enforcement officers
to determine the immigration status of anyone involved in a lawful stop,
detention, or arrest where “reasonable suspicion exists” that the person is
unlawfully present. As Arizona became ground zero in a contentious struggle
over porous borders and Latino rights, undocumented immigrants living next
door in New Mexico were granted driver’s licenses and in-state tuition. New
Mexico has a broadly celebrated Latino heritage and a strong emphasis on
integration in which community groups and state and local governments
work together to incorporate the foreign-born into the collective fabric.3
These contrasting governing regimes for immigrants have deep historical
roots unseen on the surface level of contemporary American politics. As we
demonstrate in this article, these governing regimes of immigration reflect
significant and distinctive relationships that developed over time between
each of these states as well as with the nation. The history of immigrants in
these two states also shows that contemporary contrasts obscure a checkered past in New Mexico as well as areas of policy convergence reflecting
complex developmental pathways.
The contrasts between Arizona and New Mexico in terms of immigrant
governance today are particularly striking due to their shared geography
and historical annexation into the United States, as well as their shared
border with Mexico. Both drafted constitutions and made a case for statehood in identical years. And by far the largest immigrant group in each of
these southwestern states comes from Mexico. Yet how do we explain the
notable variations in the immigrant-governing regimes in these two states?
Equally important, why did New Mexico in the past at times pursue policies
that were repressive toward newcomers of particular ethnic backgrounds,
an approach seemingly at odds with its inclusionary traditions and contemporary reputation?
Linda Noel’s exemplary research on New Mexican pluralism and Arizonan marginalization strategies during statehood debates of the early twentieth century serves as an important starting point. Strikingly, Noel finds
that the complex national political debates and policy outcomes concerning
immigrants in this period were influenced by how Arizona and New Mexico
framed the relationship between Mexicans and American identity. Indeed,
after examining processes of marginalization and pluralism in the origins
of Arizona and New Mexico, Noel leaves behind the individual states to
illuminate how these strategies were employed in immigration politics on the
national stage. For reasons all too familiar to immigration policy scholars,
pluralist ideals were overwhelmed in the 1920s by marginalization blueprints
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that elevated notions of the temporary Mexican worker in national debates
over immigration restriction. Furthermore, Noel illustrates the common
ground found between those using a marginalization strategy and the exclusionists to explain the repatriation of Mexican workers in the 1930s.4
While Noel’s writing on the legacy of statehood debates in the American
Southwest sheds light on national political responses to Mexican immigrants
writ large, our interest in this subject is driven more by similarities and
variations in how Arizona and New Mexico responded to new immigrants
and national political pressures in the early decades of the twentieth century.
Put another way, an important story can be told about immigrant inclusion and exclusion in the states that complements national conceptions of
belonging. Pluralist and marginalization approaches evolve in Arizona and
New Mexico, separate from their use at the national level, and impact the
treatment of not just Mexicans or Mexican Americans, but other immigrant
groups as well, often in unexpected ways. This article argues that while at
its founding, New Mexico was a more inclusive space for a Mexican-origin
population and Mexican immigrants, other immigrant groups received a
chillier if not repressive response. In particular, New Mexico highlights
ways in which inclusive political culture and policies do not extend to all
immigrants but only immigrants who have already fought for and won
inclusion for their cultural or racial identity. Inclusion of some often rests
on triangulation with other “outsiders.” For its part, Arizona continually
refused to integrate immigrants and non-white ethnics into their state, but
remained steadily reliant on immigrant labor. As we shall see, Arizona would
follow a model not dissimilar from the Southern Confederacy, driven by
the twin catalysts of economic expediency and racial hierarchy. In surprising ways, then, our Southwestern research uncovers that inclusion can be
racially specific while at the same time exclusion does not have to be so.
These insights lead us to argue for a more cautious understanding of what
counts as an inclusive or exclusive state, a binary that has been present in
much work on state-level immigration policy.5 New Mexico and Arizona
complicate neat categorization of inclusion and exclusion and help us see
patterns of long-term political development and historical (in)consistency.
Our findings also highlight the extent to which immigrant experiences, even
in relation to key national policies, often vary across states.
This article trains a spotlight on immigration politics and policies in Arizona and New Mexico in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
We begin by briefly discussing the distinctive constitutional and statehood
struggles in Arizona and New Mexico, yielding divergent power structures
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and claims to national belonging that cast long shadows on how each state
received immigrants and responded to federal demands and national issues
of the day. The bulk of this article, however, carefully examines how Arizona
and New Mexico sought to govern two key immigrant groups—new European arrivals and Japanese settlers—during their formative years through
World War II. This in-depth historical comparison of two neighboring southwestern states with conflicting ideological traditions and power structures
provides a glimpse of the analytical value of studying subnational places
of immigrant inclusion and exclusion.
Ethnic Power and Subjugation
in the Southwest Statehood Debates
The contrasting strategies and claims advanced by Arizona and New
Mexico in their pursuit of new constitutions, statehood, and national standing can be traced to the relationship between Anglos and people of Mexican
descent in these adjacent territories during the late nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries. The Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, ratified in 1848,
forcibly incorporated roughly 525,000 square miles of previously Mexican
territory, bringing an estimated 75,000 people of Mexican descent under
US jurisdiction. Most of these long-term natives of what we now call the
US Southwest lived along the Rio Grande: sixty thousand in the territory
that would become the state of New Mexico, only one thousand in Arizona,
and the rest in California, Texas, and Colorado.6 These nativos or Hispano
Americanos had one year to accept US citizenship, and with it full rights
and immunities under the law, which nearly all did.
Arizona began as a far less populous state than its neighbor but grew
steadily as federal legislation in the late nineteenth century (including the
Desert Lands Act of 1877 and the Dawes Act of 1887) distributed land at
low cost and with few restrictions to new Anglo settlers. The Army Corps
of Engineers and Reclamation Service also initiated irrigation projects in
this period that directly benefited new Anglo farming, ranching, and mining
ventures and corporations, while shifting water away from small landholders
of Mexican descent.7 The historian David Berman estimates that the Latino
population in Arizona dropped sharply from 45 percent of the state’s total
population in 1870 to just 20 percent by the turn of century. In addition,
over time those of Mexican descent in Arizona increasingly were Mexican
immigrants and temporary workers who came to fill unskilled jobs for large
Anglo mining, ranching, and agricultural operations.8
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By contrast, New Mexico from the start had the largest population of
Spanish-speaking people in the region. With roughly sixty thousand of
the roughly seventy-five thousand original Hispanos residing in the state’s
territory when it was forcibly incorporated into the United States in 1848,
this group remained the majority in New Mexico in the decades that followed. By 1900, scholars estimate somewhere between 50 and 75 percent
of New Mexico’s 195,000 residents were of Mexican descent. Unlike the
many disenfranchised Mexican Americans in Arizona, Hispanos exercised
considerable political clout in New Mexico, where they comprised at least
half of the votes (but usually more), had influence in both major parties,
and held notable shares of local and state elected offices during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.9
The fact that people of Mexican descent were numerous, economically
diverse, and politically influential in New Mexico was anathema to the Anglo
American economic and political elite of Arizona. Indeed, these territories
formally separated during the Civil War era precisely because Anglo Americans migrating west came to dominate Arizona while Anglo newcomers
shared power with the more dominant Hispanos of New Mexico. As Ginger
C. Stull writes, it was a fundamental divide “ . . . between Hispanic American
populations in what is now New Mexico who wanted the rights [guaranteed
by the Treaty of Hidalgo] protected, and Anglo American populations in what
is now Arizona who were denying Spanish speakers the rights to vote, hold
office and participate in schools.”10 For four decades, these contrasts between
neighboring territories received negligible attention. In the Progressive Era,
however, these two territories gained prominence on the national agenda
when the US Senate Committee on Territories, led by Albert Beveridge
(R-IL), conducted a fact-finding tour in the Southwest that placed a heavy
emphasis on ethnic, racial, and linguistic characteristics of Arizonan and
New Mexican populations. Beveridge supported US expansion but opposed
statehood for territories with large Latino, Asian, or Native American populations. During hearings in New Mexico, Beveridge and his colleagues worried
about bilingualism and Hispano influence across the territory.
Against this backdrop, the federal government proposed in 1906 to join
the two territories into a single state as a means of mitigating the influence
of Hispanos and fostering greater Anglo American control over the entire
region. The Arizona Territory immediately protested, however, arguing that
its unchallenged regime of Anglo American dominance over economic,
social, and political life would be compromised by New Mexico’s contrasting system of ethnic power-sharing. Striking differences in language
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policy for education, elections, and government business was an especially
important flashpoint between the territories.
The quest for statehood meant that each territory had to make its own
individual case to the president and Congress. The Senate Committee on
Territories stated that both states must limit Spanish in an official capacity.
More specifically, the use of interpreters would not be allowed in conducting
affairs of the government. Furthermore, public schools were to be conducted
entirely in English. Consistent with its history of power sharing between
Hispanos and Anglo Americans, the New Mexican constitution defied the
edicts of the Senate Committee on Territories by stipulating three provisions to protect Spanish. The constitution stated that persons did not have
to speak English to vote, hold office, or sit on a jury. Training was provided
so that teachers could become proficient in both English and Spanish, and
children of Spanish descent would never be classed in separate schools. The
constitution did, however, also state that public schools would be conducted
in English.11 There was a language difference but not a racial chasm in New
Mexico; the state was defining Hispanos as being “of Spanish descent” but
not a separate race. The founding documents, however, recognize the threat
of racial discrimination and its authors wrote protections into the initial
constitution: “This State shall never enact any law restricting or abridging
the right of suffrage on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” As additional protection, the constitution reaffirms the inviolability
of the Treaty of Guadalupe Hildago in its bill of rights.
The constitution of Arizona, in striking contrast, required language of
instruction to be in English and provided no allowance for public documents or ballots to be translated into Spanish.12 Legislation within the first
year of statehood furthered discrimination based on language: “No person
who cannot speak, write and read the English language shall be eligible to
hold any State, county, or precinct office in the State of Arizona. . . .”13 This
ensured Arizona would not face the same power sharing in the near future as
that experienced in New Mexico, where over half the initial representatives
were Hispanos. Additionally, in that first year Arizona passed legislation that
stated, “All schools must be taught in the English Language.”14 Arizona’s
exclusive understanding of American identity as white, and white as tied
to English and an Anglo culture, was more in step with understandings of
belonging across the country.
Arizona and New Mexico, each securing statehood in 1912, employed
contrasting strategies on how to sell their worthiness to the larger United
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States. Arizona marginalized Mexican heritage, explicitly arguing that the
Mexican descendants would either remain under the control of the dominant
Anglos or return to their own country. In contrast, New Mexico pursued
an inclusive strategy with regards to the existent Hispano population. Arizona’s tactic, more aligned with dominant federal understandings of race
and American identity, firmly situated the state within the nation, opening up
space for Arizona to align with anti-federal racist ideologies and a virulent
early nativism.
In contrast to Arizona’s racist, anti-immigrant politics in early statehood, New Mexico consciously argued that the Mexican origin population
within their territory would become members of the United States as
Spanish Americans, much like the European ancestors of other Americans. This relied on triangulation against other “outsiders” at the moment,
both Indians and African Americans.15 New Mexico pushed to include
Hispanos, even without cultural assimilation, specifically calling on their
right to speak Spanish.16 The New Mexican fight for inclusion of this
population, however, resulted in institutional resources that future citizens
could draw on for defense of a limited ethnic pluralism.17 It also resulted
in a state with an insecure footing in American identity, an insecurity
that would allow cultural concerns to drive much of the response to early
immigration.
Reductionist accounts of the origin stories of Arizona and New Mexico
could conclude that the inclusion and exclusion evident in present-day legislation is a direct legacy of diverging approaches taken to secure statehood.
As we detail below, however, a more complicated reality unfolds in both
states, as New Mexico’s defense of its Hispano population not only led to
an insecure place within white American identity but also encouraged an
exclusionary response to other immigrant groups. Due to economic concerns read through the lenses of racial hierarchies and states’ rights, Arizona
pushed to keep immigrants within its borders when doing so served those
in power. Through close historical analysis, we see the nuanced official
responses of Arizona and New Mexico to both European and Japanese
immigrant groups, approaches that challenge simple characterizations of
New Mexico as inclusive and Arizona as exclusionary. Extending from their
distinctive origins and struggles for statehood, we shall discern the lasting
importance of contrasting ethnic group power and claims to national belonging as each state responded to both new immigration and fresh pressures
from the federal government.
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The Inclusion and Exclusion
of European Immigrants
The competing traditions of limited pluralism and racial subjugation
dominant in New Mexico and Arizona help us understand their early
responses to immigrant groups from Europe. The unique ethnic power
sharing that defined New Mexico from early statehood did not create a
broadly inclusive pluralism. In fact, we see a heightened need for state
symbolic action that sharpened the edges around the distinctive claims to
an American identity that included those of Spanish descent by excluding others. Calls for exclusion and targeting of other suspect European
immigrants as a contrast to Spanish Americans was one attempt to shore
up acceptance of New Mexico as part of the United States. Arizona’s marginalization strategy for achieving statehood also echoed through their early
nativist stances against Europeans, but with different outcomes for European immigrants in the state. Calls for exclusion appeared when European
immigrants presented a challenge to the racially segmented and pliable
workforce; if, however, immigrants could be incorporated into such a labor
market while still promoting Anglo dominance, no such vibrant calls for
restriction emerged.
Serving as Arizona’s first governor from 1912 to 1917 and again from
late 1917 to 1919, George W. P. Hunt, a Democrat and successful businessman, took the lead in rousing state government to restrict immigrant rights
and admissions for “new” European immigration and other newcomers
deemed undesirable. In December 1914, Hunt and the state lawmakers
worked together to codify an “Act to Protect the Citizens of the United
States in Their Employment against Noncitizens of the United States.” The
measure required any Arizona employer of more than five workers “regardless of kind or class of work or sex of workers” to reserve at least 80 percent
of their positions for native-born workers.18 This was designed to favor
native-born English, Irish, German, Scandinavians, and other older stock
groups. “Other persons of European descent such as Italians, Spaniards, and
those from Eastern Europe were not considered full members of the broader
‘white’ community,” as Luis Plascencia explains. “This racialized scheme
positioned Mexicans below these two groups, and Native Americans below
Mexicans.”19 Under the new law, employers who failed to adhere to this
mandate faced $100 fines and possible imprisonment, as did workers who
falsely claimed native citizenship to obtain employment. Less than a year
after its enactment, the US Supreme Court ruled that the legislation violated
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the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. As Charles Evans
Hughes’s majority opinion noted,
It is sought to justify this act as an exercise of the power of the State to
make reasonable classifications in legislating to promote the health, safety,
morals and welfare of those within its Jurisdiction. But this admitted
authority, with the broad range of legislative discretion that it implies,
does not go so far as to make it possible for the State to deny to lawful
inhabitants, because of their race or nationality, the ordinary means of
earning a livelihood. It requires no argument to show that the right to work
for a living in the common occupations of the community is of the very
essence of the personal freedom and opportunity that it was the purpose
of the Amendment to secure.20

Undaunted by this judicial setback, Hunt warned in 1916 that Arizona
could not flourish so long as traditional Northern and Western European
settlers were overshadowed by Mexicans and “new” Europeans. Reporting
to state lawmakers that 55.5 percent of convicts in Arizona prisons and 55.1
percent of patients at the State Hospital for the Insane were of “alien blood”
or “belong either to Mexican or other foreign races,” Hunt questioned “why
the State of Arizona should continue to encourage a kind of immigration
that imposes upon the taxpayers between 50 and 60 percent of the total
expense incurred for the care of deficient classes.”21 Hunt’s animus toward
“foreign races” was shared not only by Arizona legislators, but also by the
state’s congressional delegation.
During World War I, however, questions about labor created clashing
interests on the question of immigration admittance. The focus on maintaining a racially segregated labor force can be seen in the call from Arizona to
loosen up restrictions for Mexican immigrants. Cotton growers in southern
Arizona were especially vexed by restrictions on their access to Mexican
migrant labor as a result of the 1917 literacy and head tax. Arizona Senator
Carl Hayden joined other western and southern lawmakers in advocating
for the “temporary admission of illiterate Mexicans” in the late 1910s and
early 1920s. Arizona governor Thomas Campbell wrote Hayden in 1920
that he was “being importuned by the agricultural forces in the State” to
allow “the importation of Mexican labor for the sole purpose of relieving
the agricultural labor shortage here.” Hayden also received urgent requests
for assistance in facilitating Mexican labor from the president of the Arizona
Chamber of Commerce and other business leaders. The same year, Hayden
testified to the House Committee on Immigration and Naturalization that
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access to Mexican foreign labor was essential: “There is no other way of
meeting the immediate agricultural labor needs in southern Arizona, except
by the temporary admission of Mexicans.”22 He added that this arrangement
would be mutually beneficial for Mexican laborers and Arizona employers.
“Arizona and Sonora are separated by an arbitrary border line,” he insisted,
“with people on the Mexican side seeking this seasonal work and people on
the American side needing their assistance.”23 While politicians worked to
create pathways into Arizona for Mexican laborers, many of whom could
return to Mexico, new European workers in the early 1920s were a threat
to Anglo workers.
New Mexico, however, more concerned about cementing its place in
America than on its labor needs, became focused on routing out disruptive
forces rather than maintaining or recruiting foreign workers. The depths
of suspicion and exclusion from American identity faced by New Mexico
can be seen in a 1918 letter to the editor entitled “America’s Unguarded
Gateway” that appeared in The North American Review under the pseudonym Henry Wray. The author suggested the southern border with Mexico
presented a danger to America in wartime:
South of the American-Mexican border, lives a race that is strange to us
and little understood. It is of mixed blood, interbred, and physically and
mentally degenerate. The average Mexican is burrow-like, stubborn, uncertain, ignorant and vindictive. Within his vestigial body blazes a hatred
for the gringo and the gringo’s country. He has an intense disgust for the
cowardly gringo and thirsts to spill gringo gore.

Germany could use this hatred, suggested Wray: “A few German officers
and some German gold effectively placed could assemble this army and
start it northward.” New Mexico, Wray continued, is more Mexican than
American, presenting a key threat to the country in this time of war:
The State has remained Mexican in every sense of the word. One may
travel a hundred miles, pass through town after town and be unable to converse in any language save Spanish. There are whole districts without any
English speaking persons, where the school boards and school teachers are
unable to read, write, or speak English. All school teachers are compelled
by the State to be examined in Spanish. The legislature is conducted in
Spanish. The courts, State and Federal, are conducted in Spanish. A foreign
language is one of the most potent aids to the success of a conspiracy. By
retaining Spanish as the language of the courts, schools, public gatherings, press, religion and politics, the Mexican population of New Mexico
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keeps itself Mexican. And it looks forward to the Mexican day when New
Mexico will again take her rightful place as a state of Mexico.

The controversy that followed this publication reveals the centrality of
concerns about New Mexico’s belonging that informed the state’s responses
to federal pressures and immigration long after achieving statehood. County
councils, concerned citizens, the Education Conference and others from
across the state expressed outrage at such questioning of New Mexico’s
loyalty. The chairman of the Executive Committee of the State Council of
Defense, Charles Springer, wrote to the US Assistant Attorney General that
the article was a “jumble of vicious and malignant lies about the people of
New Mexico and conditions existing in the State, and as to the loyalty of
our people. It is unnecessary to state here that the loyalty and patriotism
of the American citizens of Spanish ancestry . . . have been demonstrated
beyond question by their support of the Government in three wars.” American citizens of Spanish ancestry were not referred to as Spanish American
citizens at this time, distinguishing them from other ethnic groups that
might be “hyphenated” Americans. Springer wanted the author of this piece
to be prosecuted; the “vicious attacks . . . that a state of treason exists in
this part of the United States . . . should be punishable under the amended
Espionage Act or other laws.”24 Similar to its claims for statehood, New
Mexico’s claims for inclusion of citizens despite their Spanish heritage or
use of the Spanish language did not extend to calls for inclusion for other
language or ethnic groups.
New Mexico, like many other states, used language and education policy
as a key tool for anti-German campaigns during World War I. Thirty-one
states issued legislation between 1917 and 1921 either making English the
language of instruction or limiting the teaching of foreign languages in
elementary schools.25 Interestingly, Arizona was not among those states.
The state’s original documents already instructed Arizona public schools to
use English. The bilingualism written into the constitution of New Mexico,
on the other hand, required the need to address the anti-German hysteria
in policy. Earlier inclusive policies actually opened the door, not for more
inclusive policies generally, but for restrictive policies in later moments of
national nativism toward different racial or ethnic groups.
New Mexico’s Board of Education in early April of 1918 passed a resolution recommending that German be taken out of the public schools. On
April 21, the Board of Regents of the University of New Mexico decided
to discontinue teaching German.26 The chair of the county council wrote to
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the state council that “it was the unanimous feeling of the members of the
county council of defense that it would be unwise at this time for a university
or school anywhere in the state of New Mexico to employ an alien enemy in
teaching, as we all felt that such relations could not be harmonious and that
the greatest opportunity in this country for combating German propaganda
and inculcating patriotism is through our public schools and colleges.”27 In
1919, New Mexico passed a law making English the language of instruction
in public elementary schools.28
Different expressions of the hysteria and 100 percent Americanism during World War I in the Southwest stemmed from the legacies of statehood
strategies, both the contested and insecure belonging in New Mexico and the
neo-confederate origins of Arizona. These contrasting orientations altered
approaches to Germans and German Americans and enforcement of wartime loyalty. After passage of the Espionage Act of 1917, people across the
country were reporting on their neighbors’ so-called street talk, anything
that questioned the righteousness or the inevitable success of the United
States in the war, the failure to buy bonds, or failure to perform patriotic
acts that would suggest a disloyal nature. In New Mexico, many of these
accusations made their way through county and state councils of defense
and to federal prosecutors. In contrast, Arizona had difficulty organizing
the state and local councils of defense29 and such formal channels were
supplemented by private actions. While Arizonans suspected of such crimes
were formally charged through federal courts, a range of state and local
organizations as well as communities also took matters into their own hands,
accusing, judging, and meting out their own punishment.
New Mexico demonstrated vigorous participation in the wartime federal
programs monitoring “enemy aliens” and other pro-German activity. The
New Mexico Council of Defense received numerous reports of disloyalty:
individuals being offered money to be German spies, teachers avowedly pro-
German, Jewish postmasters sowing disloyalty among the “natives” (here
meaning Spanish Americans), and hospitals refusing to fly an American
flag because “every person up there is an Alien,” among other complaints.
The New Mexico Council of Defense received “so many stories of Pro-
Germans and disloyalty these days that we do not believe any of them until
they are corroborated.”30 In letters to the Council of Defense of the State
of New Mexico, Germans were described as being “lower” than Indians or
generally unable to be trusted. A rancher wrote: “The case of the German-
American is so important that it should be considered by itself. While I am
confident, . . . that the great majority of New Mexico German-Americans
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are perfectly loyal in act and intent, at the same time I notice among them
. . . a tendency to a certain dishonesty of view that rules out complete
mental loyalty on their part.” During World War I, New Mexico was stuck
between the national distrust of German and other “hyphenated” Americans
and a defense of their state and its Spanish American population as loyal
Americans. The move to claim an American identity for Spanish-speaking
citizens did not, however, soften the anti-German rhetoric in the state.
Tomas Jaehn states that during World War I, ethnic Germans encountered
not only suspicion but accusations and actions. Even if we were to accept
his characterization of these hostilities as “mild” and “insignificant,”31 the
existence of anti-German sentiment within New Mexico is keenly notable
in contrast to its embrace of Spanish and Mexican Americans at its time of
statehood. This ethnically distinctive state frequently used formal channels
to report on suspicious Germans, and its visible actions against the German
language were used as public signals to assert belonging in the American
political community.
While New Mexico was emphasizing its key place within the United
States, Arizona, more certain of its Americanness, was engaging in acts
protective of the nation but also protective of Arizona, distinct from the
nation. As previously established, Arizona had established its American credentials through earlier racial and linguistic restrictions.32 While editorials
in Arizona newspapers indicated suspicion toward Germans, the incidents of
prosecution and persecution crossed ethnic boundaries. Germans in Arizona,
along with others, faced attacks from private organizations and vigilante
groups. A mob attempted to shave the corners off a German resident’s mustache.33 Mexicans and Mexican Americans also fell victim to the wartime
loyalty concerns. In Bisbee, a sixteen-year-old Mexican student reportedly
refused to salute the flag one afternoon. After a two-hour hearing, classmates determined the punishment for the “rebellious alien” was to learn the
Star-Spangled Banner and perform it while saluting the flag. Should he fail
to do so, he would be forced to carry a flag all day while being subject to
beatings from the student court members. Another “Mexican” worker who
did not salute the flag when requested almost met serious injury by a mob
in Prescott. This person was saved from the mob by a judge and thrown in
jail to await a trial. Newspapers reported prosecution of utterances about
the war effort in federal courts in Arizona or through community-enforced
sanctions such as tar and feathering, forced saluting of flags and other public displays of shaming and forced patriotism, as well as beatings. These
accounts suggest, however, that Germans or German Americans were not
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central targets, but one group of many, as most do not carry any indication
of the ethnic background of the accused.34
Arizona displayed a vigilante vigor in its policing of loyalty; this, however,
was primarily about radical labor and the rough and tumble world of party
politics in the state. Concerns about disloyalty in Arizona were dominated
by attacks on the IWW and the broader Red Scare campaign. Throughout
World War I gubernatorial candidates used loyalty as a central dividing line,
headlines regularly connected strikes, unions, and loyalty to America, and
politicians of all levels in the state were asked to make explicit statements
about their views on the possible disloyalty of the IWW. Germans—to the
extent that they were part of the larger subversive work force—faced threats
from the state and local communities. And Mexicans—to the extent that
they were good workers—were understood as loyal. Consequently the state
would fight the federal government for their admittance into the racially
subjugated workforce. For Arizona, then, debates about belonging happened
at the intersection of labor and loyalty, with ethnicity playing a secondary
and supporting role.
In relation to European immigrants, New Mexico worked to publicly
exclude ethnic others as a way to reinforce its own identity and worthiness
as an American state. New Mexico’s tolerance did not extend beyond those
who already shared power (Anglos and Hispanos). Due to the previous work
undertaken by Arizona to establish its identity as racially and linguistically
pure, a display of anti-German sentiment was not needed to underscore the
loyalty and even patriotism of the state, and therefore focused on the threat
to the labor market in the state. Arizona’s response to immigrants continued
to be founded in economic concerns.
Anti-Japanese Sentiment
Looking at the response to Japanese immigrants in the first half of the
twentieth century, we see more similarities than differences between the
treatment Japanese received in Arizona and New Mexico. The limited
inclusion developed toward Hispanos and Mexicans in New Mexico did
not extend to Asian immigrants, as New Mexico joined its Southwestern
neighbor and much of the West in a sustained campaign limiting the rights
of Japanese and Japanese Americans from statehood through World War
II. Despite small numbers of Japanese workers and residents, both states
jumped on the regional bandwagon to call for restrictions on Japanese
immigration, to set up barriers for Japanese to own land, and ultimately
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to play key roles in internment.35 The fact that states with very different
approaches to dealing with the meeting of a Mexican population created
similar legislation to limit rights or prevent residence of Japanese immigrants illuminates the limited reach of New Mexico’s push against white
supremacy. New Mexican tolerance and an established sense of a tri-cultural
state (i.e., Anglos, Hispanos, and Mexicans) provided no protection to the
Japanese in the early twentieth century. In fact, for a state uncertain of
its place in American identity, publicly excluding a race that was being
demonized in the nation was important, even if the economic competition
was not a large concern. In Arizona, however, the centrality of economic
exploitation to sustain Anglo dominance led similar anti-Japanese policies
to have different implications for those living within the state.
Arizona was an early adopter of the anti-alien land laws, attempting to
restrict immigrants’ ability to own land, targeting those from Asia and in
particular from Japan. Arizona passed such a law in 1913, the same year
as California.36 In 1921, Arizona passed an additional measure tightening
restrictions on landholding in an attempt to remove loopholes that might
let family members hold land for the Japanese.37 New Mexico joined in the
anti-Japanese movement as well in 1921; Governor Mechem’s list of recommended legislative measures for that year included an alien land law and a
law preventing non-citizens from possessing firearms.38 Later that year the
New Mexican constitution was amended to exclude individuals ineligible
for citizenship and corporations whose majority stockholders fell into that
category from owning land.
By joining the anti-Japanese movement in the western states, despite
limited economic competition, New Mexico made a clear statement that
although Spanish Americans were included side by side with Anglos, this
inclusion did not extend to others. In the face of a rumor of forty Japanese
families considering moving to Mesilla Valley, the farm bureau of Donna
County wrote in the Las Cruces Republican:
The Spanish American population of the state, and the American, get along
very nicely together—one supplies the majority of the labor, the other the
bulk of the capital. There is practically no antipathy between them, in fact,
some of the former are among the most influential and progressive in our
state, and the vast majority are no longer Spanish-American, but just plain
American, rapidly adopting the standards of living and education of the
American, and seeking not to lower the standards, as does the Jap, but
to come up to the American standard. He is a citizen of long standing, in
fact, the first in the state in the point of time.39
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Making an argument for the exclusion of the Japanese required a forceful distinction between the Spanish Americans and this new racial other.
Spanish Americans, they argued, evidently belonged because of their long
history of citizenship and similar standards of living as Anglos, both relics
of the strategies developed during the statehood debates. The Japanese, on
the other hand, would work for lower wages and undercut the American
standard of living. As farmers in the border valley attempted to raise the
alarm about the threat of the Japanese, they drew on racialized fears of the
inability of Japanese to assimilate, religious differences, miscegenation, and
permanent loyalty to another country.40 The Las Cruces Republic in 1920
told New Mexico to “Wake Up”: “The Japanese are industrious, they are
good farmers—perhaps better than the average American—but they are not
Anglo-Saxon and never can be. . . . Will you look pleasantly on the picture
of your daughter being brought up in the public schools with a yellow boy
as her seat mate, with his oriental ideas of morality? . . . Let us not allow
cowardly diplomacy to force another mixture in our already over mixed
race.”41 Racialized arguments to exclude the Japanese from land ownership,
heard throughout the West, carried a different meaning in New Mexico.
Acceptance of the tri-cultural pluralism of New Mexico led to drawing a
tight circle around those groups and a need to exclude racialized others.
While limited economic competition in the border area may account for the
origins of concerns about the Japanese, economic threat does not explain
why the restrictions on alien land ownership were approved by the state’s
voters in 1921. As anti-Japanese sentiment swept through the West, Anglos
and Hispanos throughout New Mexico joined together to alienate Asians,
underscoring what Jamie Bronstein labels New Mexico’s “nationalist bona
fides.”42
In Arizona, alien land laws were far from symbolic but part of the ongoing contested politics around subjugation of non-whites who had a role to
play economically but not socially or politically. Despite the land laws of
Arizona, by 1930 there were over one hundred independent Japanese farms
in Maricopa County. Anti-Japanese feelings came to a head in 1934 when
farmers formed an “Orientals Exclusion League” and announced a “Jap
Moving Day” on August 25th, a day by which all Japanese should leave
Phoenix. The threat to diplomatic relations if expulsion or violence were
to occur drew the attention of the national and international community.
Governor Moeur of Arizona received worried telegrams from the Japanese
Consulate in Los Angeles and the US Acting Secretary of State. The British Consul contacted the governor saying that there were threats of mob
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violence against the East Indian community. The governor’s response to each
of these inquiries was very similar; he was sure that the “common sense of
the people of Arizona will prevent any violence” and that “the laws of this
state will be enforced without fear or favor.”43 At first, the governor’s reassurances seemed an accurate prediction. The threat of forced removal did
not occur by the date announced, but court proceedings did begin against
the Japanese for violating the Alien Land Law. Such “common sense,”
however, did not last.
From September through November, violence against the Japanese,
including shooting, bombing, flooding of farms, and arson, occurred in
the Salt River Valley, bringing criticism from forces within Arizona, as
well as from Washington, DC, and Japan. The Japanese government again
appealed directly to the governor as well as the Secretary of State to stop
such incidents. Governor Moeur responded to the Japanese embassy’s retelling of the acts of terror against Japanese farmers with a statement that “there
has not been, and from every indication will not be, any serious violence.”
He attributed specific incidents to “communistic or ‘Red’ activities in the
Salt River Valley,” putting the origins of any unrest back onto the federal
government, whom he implored to cooperate with their anti-Communist
efforts: “It is essential that we have the fullest cooperation from the Department of Justice and the Immigration Department in our endeavors to curb
these Communistic activities.”44 Here the governor suggested any problems
were from foreign agitators within the labor movement, and the federal
government failed in their tasks. The remedy, according to the governor,
was for the federal government to provide support for the state to continue
its mission of weeding out the communists.
Governor Moeur also received pressure from within the state to stop
the violence. The Southside Ministerial Association, for example, issued a
resolution and petitioned the governor to use law enforcement agencies to
stop the violence and arrest the bombers. Mr. Wilke of the Arizona Peace
Officers’ Association told the governor in the beginning of November that
something drastic needed to be done to end “this reign of terrorism” against
Japanese and Hindu famers. These calls fell on deaf ears. By the end of
that month, the Japanese Consulate wrote in clear exhaustion one last time
about his distress that not a single perpetrator had been charged while the
violence continued with no indication of any law enforcement efforts to
help. In December, the governor once again dismissed accusations of acts
against Hindu growers as exaggerations and ensured the Secretary of State
it was under control.
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While no action was taken against those engaged in terror in the fall and
early winter of 1934, legal action against the Japanese farmers continued,
and new ways to restrict access to land were devised. In the beginning of
October, Governor Moeur formed a committee to look into the “problems
surrounding the enforcement of Arizona’s Alien land law.” A new, even more
stringent law was introduced into the state legislature in 1935 that would
have prevented Japanese from leasing or even entering onto land to do any
farm work. This law drew national attention, in part for further threatening
diplomatic relations with Japan, and the governor was encouraged to veto
it.45 The bill that would have challenged not just Japanese ownership of land
but also potential use of Japanese labor by others did not pass.
While the legislative responses of the states look similar, Arizona’s controversy and enforcement of alien land laws surpassed those of New Mexico.
Arizona’s alien land laws were targeting not just the small number of Japanese farmers but also Chinese and Indian farmers. Here we see economic
competition and a strong white identity driving Arizona’s subjugation of a
broad range of outsiders. While the alien land laws of New Mexico were
less aggressive than its neighbor’s, the existence of the laws and underlying
anti-Japanese sentiment should be strongly noted. The land laws here were
not focused on economic considerations, nor were they evidently met with
the same grassroots violence seen elsewhere. There was a muted politics
of exclusion.
Similarly, during World War II, racialized understandings of loyalty
drove responses in both states; their origin stories, however, influenced
their responses to internment. The desire to exclude as well as to display
their belonging to the nation dominated New Mexico’s response to Japanese
and Japanese Americans during the war. While Arizona initially responded
with a similarly racialized drive to exclude, as the war progressed, Arizona
turned to the interned Japanese in response to labor shortages during the war.
Again we see the binary labeling of states as either inclusive or exclusive
ignores the nuanced negotiations often at work within a single state.
In January of 1942, the federal government asked all non-US citizens who
were Japanese (along with Germans and Italians) to re-register at post offices
and receive a Certificate of Identification. The next month the United States
Attorney General declared those areas that surrounded critical infrastructure
restricted or prohibited. Eighteen such areas were declared in Arizona, causing the removal of “enemy aliens.” In New Mexico, Japanese enemy aliens
from the Clovis area were taken into custody by Immigration Services and
kept at Fort Stanton, an INS-operated detention area for prisoners of war
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and enemy aliens.46 The early concentration of Japanese caused complaints
from the nearby community in Capitan, leading the INS agent in charge
to remove the school children due to the “hostile sentiments.”47 This was
the beginning of what would be years of struggle in both New Mexico and
Arizona with Japanese residence and relocation during World War II. New
Mexico and Arizona initially hoped that relocation would mean moving
Japanese Americans and Japanese out of the state, further east. Neither state
welcomed the idea of inheriting new populations of Issei, first generation
Japanese immigrants, or Nisei, second generation. Both states, however,
became sites for internment camps.
Prior to relocation, Arizona had about 630 individuals who would have
been targeted for relocation, and many hoped they would be moved out of
the state.48 Instead, Arizona became home to two large relocation centers,
one near Poston that housed up to eighteen thousand people and one on
the Gila River that housed up to thirteen thousand.49 New Mexico, which
had over 180 Japanese who would be subject to internment, became the
site of four different centers. Fort Stanton, Lordsburg, Santa Fe, and Old
Ranton Ranch all held concentration camps during the war years, alternating between processing centers for Japanese internees, POW camps for
Germans and Italians, and camps for Japanese and Japanese American men
who were thought to be dangerous or causing trouble in the other internment
camps.50 Between March 1942 and April 1946, over 4,500 men were held
in the Santa Fe Camp alone.
Racialized conceptions of loyalty and the support of relocation emerged
from the highest offices and from the populace in both Arizona and New
Mexico. Governor Osborn of Arizona noted of the Japanese who had been
evacuated to Arizona, the “general attitude . . . is that while they would be
willing to fight against Germany or Italy, they are not willing to fight against
Japan” and that no Japanese Americans or Japanese have “denounce[d] the
activities of . . . spies to our authorities.” These “facts,” Osborn concluded,
meant that the loyalty of those of Japanese descent ultimately lay with a
foreign government. The governor did not make a distinction based on
whether one was born in the United States or not. However, when considering policy responses nativity mattered; for those Japanese not born in the
United States the answer was clear: deportation. Meanwhile, “the disposition of native born Japanese is a very serious and vexatious question.”51
The challenge was dealing with citizenship and attendant legal protections:
“While a disposition of the native born citizens of Japanese blood is not
so simple, still it must be worked out in line with realities. It is hard to use
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sentiment and consideration for people who have shown that they regard
such motives as weakness.”52 In language eerily similar to contemporary
conversations about becoming radicalized by visits to the Middle East,
he wrote that “particularly dangerous, are those who were born here and
have visited Japan in the last ten years.”53 Loyalty was not about time in
the United States but about race, as the loyalty of first generation Japanese
“differs from young Americans of German or Italian parentage.”54
Letters from citizens to the Governor of Arizona also displayed a view
of loyalty and membership grounded in genetic predispositions: “They [the
Japanese] are the most treacherous people on the earth and their words and
promises does [sic] not mean a thing. It does not matter if they are U.S.
citizens or not, they will put all their efforts in favor of Japan. . . . A Jap is
and always will be a Jap in the interest of Japan.”55 The governor replied
to the letter writer, C.H. Nelson, noting that most United States citizens
agreed with his sentiment and that he believed the Japanese would not be
“dumped” on Arizona; in fact, he noted, any Japanese currently residing
in Arizona would be required to move further east.56 Organizations such
as the Elks Lodge issued resolutions addressing the state being “infested”
with Japanese, some of whom were actively plotting to attack America.
Delay in addressing this problem would be “deadly.”57 While supportive of
federal action and internment, Arizonans did not initially want the Japanese
interned in Arizona. At the beginning of March 1942, the governor received
an outpouring of support on the stand he took against resettling Japanese
in Arizona.
Similarly, New Mexico, while supportive of internment and concerned
about the Japanese problem, did not want to see Japanese settling in the
state. In early March, concerns about a plan to move forty to sixty thousand
Japanese to New Mexico rippled through the state. The plan came from a
private individual hoping to capitalize on brokering the deal; initial confusion, however, led some to think the plan came from the federal government.
Upon hearing of the plan, Governor Miles of New Mexico immediately
informed the War Department that he supported interment, which they hoped
would come with heavy guards, but opposed moving Japanese to the state
in part because of the economic problems associated with such a massive
resettlement: “The movement of Japanese seeking employment presents an
entirely different problem. In fairness to all concerned, I believe I should
point out at this time it will be virtually impossible for Japanese workers to
find employment in New Mexico since we have a large number of our own
residents idle and others dependent on the Wpa [sic] for their livelihood.”58
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Communities throughout New Mexico protested such a move as well. The
Espanola Chamber of Commerce offered to help forcibly put Japanese aliens
or citizens of Japanese descent in “concentration camps,” but continued that
they were “unalterabl[y] opposed to any colonization or the acquisition of
land by the above classes.”59 The Albuquerque mayor Clyde Tingley said,
“California can keep her Japs—she has plenty of desert to keep them in and
so has Arizona.”60 In the mayor and former governor’s objection, we hear a
demand for New Mexico not to be treated as a second-class state in relation
to its southwest neighbors, harkening to their deep-seated insecurity of not
being seen as a “Real American State.” The governor also made publicly
known his stance against the unpoliced movement of Japanese into the
state, adding that the threat to New Mexico was both economic and social
in nature.61 The fears about Japanese “colonization” continued to stir citizen concerns, even in the face of a lack of evidence about the sincerity of
such a plan, causing, according to Richard Melzer, “a public outcry seldom
equaled in New Mexico history.”62
In Deming, on the border with Mexico, residents held a protest in response
to rumors that 350 Japanese planned to arrive within a few weeks. The
chairman of the Chamber of Commerce wrote to the governor applauding his stance against Japanese moving to New Mexico and supportive of
further restrictions on Japanese owning land. He noted that the majority of
residents stood firmly against Japanese moving to the area: “It so happens
that we have had a few radical citizens who individually would like to see
the Jap settlement. However, such citizens do not amount to one in a thousand. You may rest assured that Luna County is back of you one hundred
per cent in your effort.”63 In Maxwell, New Mexico, a debate over selling
land for a Japanese settlement revealed how the desire to exclude Japanese
in the state was stronger than the lure of economic benefits to be gained
by their settlement. Many voiced opposition to the settlement of some two
hundred Japanese families in the area, but the mayor suggested that those
petitions in opposition were not representative of the city and certainly not
of landowners. After the mayor interviewed almost all the resident farmers
of the area, thirty-two signed a petition in favor of Japanese settlement and
thirteen did not. The mayor noted that eleven of the thirteen preferred not to
sign but would be willing to sell their land to Japanese, indicating concerns
about how a signature on a petition supporting Japanese settlement would be
perceived.64 Governor Miles, however, fully opposed to settlement of Japanese, called on the Attorney General Edward Chase to investigate limits on
the capacity of anyone of “the Japanese race” to acquire real estate in New
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Mexico through legal proceedings, and if necessary bring a case, funded by
the governor, to the Supreme Court.65 He also encouraged western governors
to participate in the effort to bring a test case to encourage the Supreme Court
to revisit an earlier ruling that the children of Japanese immigrants born
in the United States should be granted birthright citizenship status.66 The
potential economic benefit to the Maxwell farmers, then, was not enough
to overcome the governor’s anti-Japanese sentiment, which echoed much of
the popular sentiment from around the state. Maxwell was the exception to
the rule in New Mexico, which included anti-Japanese associations forming
in places like Doña Ana County and pledges from land owners not to sell
land to the Japanese, thousands in Mesilla Valley alone.67
While many western governors agreed on the issue of Japanese internment
and relocation, the Oregon governor’s unorthodox stance shows that this
was not an inevitable response to this pressure. Governor Sprague advocated investigating individual Japanese families and allowing those shown
to be dependable to live privately and to be dispersed, not concentrated. He
hoped that this would “prevent the deterioration of Japanese-Americans
into citizens with anti-American feelings and we will enable them to make
effective contribution of their labor.”68 While Sprague noted the possibility of Japanese labor being a contribution, such labor in New Mexico was
understood as competition.
Arizona came to capitalize on Japanese labor and further marginalize
the population so they would not be economic competitors. In March 1943,
Arizona enacted a law that required anyone with business dealings with
“persons of restricted movement” to register the transaction in triplicate.
The Gila News-Courier, a paper published by those at the Gila relocation
center, noted that this law would eliminate the ability of persons of Japanese ancestry from conducting any business. The interned Japanese writing
the editorial believed that “with this law California’s restrictionaries have
been outdone in a discriminatory, un-American practice.”69 This law moved
further toward the marginalized and pliable labor desired in Arizona.
During the war there was a shortage of labor to pick the long staple cotton
grown uniquely in Arizona and centrally important to the war effort as it was
used to weave parachutes for the military. The governor and other actors in
the state considered a wide range of different groups to help fill this role.
Individuals incarcerated in the state prison in Florence were made to pick
the cotton. Papagos, or native Indians who moved back and forth across the
border, were also key to the cotton-picking effort.70 Japanese internees were
another source of workers used to address the labor shortage. The governor,
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along with representatives from various affected counties, requested and
received approval from General Dewitt and the War Relocation Authority to
recruit up to eighteen thousand interned Japanese to work the in the cotton
fields.71 Arizona moved quickly from an initial desire to exclude Japanese
and Japanese Americans at the start of the war to understanding them as
another group ripe for racial subjugation feeding the white state.
Indicative of the neo-confederate Anglo identity driving the search for
labor at this time, when General Dewitt rescinded permission to employ
internees in November, the governor requested “colored” soldiers stationed
at Huachuca be asked to pick the cotton. There was pushback against such
a request, both from within the army and from others. The secretary of the
NAACP wrote: “It is characteristic of uninformed white people to think that
the mentality of the majority of Negroes is such that prior to enlistment in
the Army they could do nothing but pick cotton. There is further affirmation of your derogatory attitude towards American Negro citizens in the
fact that you conspicuously neglected to include in your request that white
soldiers stationed in Arizona be assigned as cotton pickers.”72 The governor responded to the NAACP denying that he asked specifically for black
soldiers but any soldiers in the state who were available. In other writing
on the matter, however, he was more revealing; he noted that many black
soldiers from Huachuca might “know nothing about picking cotton. On the
other hand, I am sure that we all agree that many are experienced cotton
pickers.”73 Turning from Japanese workers to other groups, the search for
pliant labor highlights racial subjugation at the core of Arizona’s political
culture.
Japanese interned labor was used to fulfill other needs in Arizona, including the production of camouflage nets or training models for the navy, as
well as needed infrastructure in the state. The land for the Poston Relocation Center, leased from the Department of the Interior, was sited on the
Colorado River Indian Tribe reservation. Before the war, the reservation
lacked critical infrastructure, such as irrigation, preventing relocation of a
larger population of Native Americans. Internment provided a way to draw
federal dollars and free labor to build up the reservation. The Japanese and
Japanese Americans confined to the sprawling complex at Poston developed schools, dams, roads, and canals transforming the Indian reservation.
After the war, the Office of Indian Affairs was able to attract more tribes
to live in the revitalized reservation, now with productive farms. As tribes
were consolidated at Poston they took up residence in the very housing the
Japanese and Japanese American workers had lived.
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Spaces of Inclusion and Exclusion
in Arizona and New Mexico
Through the early twentieth century, a time when federal power had
unquestionable supremacy in the realm of immigration, we see immigrants
encountering different terrains in two neighboring states. New Mexico and
Arizona, although neither a bastion of American pluralism during the tumultuous war years, have distinctive traditions that informed their responses
to new national pressures. Arizona’s strategy of entering the union through
promises of marginalizing its non-Anglo population, fulfilled through denial
of fundamental citizenship rights, cast a long shadow of economic and political subordination of racial others that informed each subsequent interaction
on questions of how to respond to immigrant residents. German immigrants
were a danger when they threatened native Anglo economic superiority.
Arizona quickly found a use for Japanese and Japanese Americans during
World War II in their racially stratified labor system. New Mexico’s origin
story, replete with promises of pluralism and power sharing, established
different pressures. The claim to include Spanish-speaking Americans as
full and equal partners in governance sat uncomfortably with notions of
race in the United States at the time, leaving New Mexico with the need to
continually reassert their “Americaness.” As a result, New Mexico vigorously fought the inclusion of European and Japanese immigrant groups in
the first four decades of the twentieth century.
Comparing these two states, then, allows us to discern how the economic
and political clout of ethnic and racial groups can be mediated by the racial
terrains and narratives of belonging that are distinctive to particular states or
subnational places. In Arizona, for example, official responses to immigrants
can only be understood in light of the ways newcomers impacted white
economic dominance in the state. In New Mexico, one cannot understand
the treatment meted out to new immigrants without an eye to the ongoing
power sharing between Anglos and Hispanos. But the extraordinary power
sharing between these two groups enshrined in the state’s constitution and
subsequent political processes contributed to an enduring insecurity about
not being part of the dominant Anglo American landscape through World
War II.
The history of each state presents a challenge to the idea of a simple
binary of inclusive or exclusive treatment of immigrants or to a static notion
of states’ approaches to immigrants. New Mexico’s repression of the use of
German during World War I cannot be disentangled from earlier protections

This content downloaded from
134.82.100.109 on Mon, 18 Mar 2019 12:56:19 UTC
All use subject to https://about.jstor.org/terms
JAEH 37_3 text.indd 28

3/26/18 11:06 AM

Jacobson, Tichenor, and Durden

29

of Spanish in its constitution. Limited pluralism for some can beget exclusion for others in later moments, especially when power sharing with non-
Anglos yields an unsure footing within the nation. The legacies of a state’s
formative experience can be long and uneven. The prohibitions against
aliens holding land in New Mexico, a powerful declaration of New Mexico’s
Americanness at the time, was only removed from its constitution in 2006.
While New Mexico was one of the last states to retain the remnants of the
alien land laws,74 the removal was not uncontested. Only four years earlier
a ballot measure to remove the language failed to pass.
Moving beyond simple binaries of ethnic and immigrant reception also
squares with the fact that immigration is a powerful cross-cutting issue in
American politics, one that defies the standard liberal-conservative divide
and often polarizes major party coalitions. As discussed in earlier work,
four rather durable ideological traditions have emerged over time in US
debates and political struggles over immigration.75 Historically, US cosmopolitans like Jane Addams and Horace Kallen embraced the universality
of the American experiment, professing deep faith in the social, economic,
cultural, and political benefits of diverse mass immigration. By contrast,
nationalist egalitarians (protectionists) opposed porous borders and soaring
immigration on the grounds that they imperil the material security of the
nation’s working class and its least advantaged citizens. In the 1870s, for
instance, Frederick Douglass favored limits on immigration, lamenting that
“every hour sees the black man elbowed out of employment by some newly
arrived immigrant.”76 Free-market expansionists (pro-business conservatives) historically tended to favor an unfettered flow of immigrant labor to
meet the needs of various US employers while opposing broad immigrant
rights. During the Gilded Age, capitalists like Andrew Carnegie described
the flow of tractable immigrant workers into the country as a “golden
stream,” valuing each newcomer as worth $1500 because “in former days
an efficient slave sold for that sum.”77 Finally, classic restrictionists have
responded to significant shifts in the ethnic, racial, or religious composition of immigration by advocating stringent border control, tough limits on
alien rights, and reductions in immigrant admissions. As Harvard President
A. Lawrence Lowell, a supporter of the Immigration Restriction League
(IRL), argued during the Progressive Era, “the need for homogeneity in a
democracy” justifies policies “resisting the influx of great numbers of a
greatly different race.”78
Tellingly, the ethnic politics and immigrant policies of Arizona and New
Mexico during the first decades of the twentieth century reflect not one,
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but several of these ideological traditions. Arizona policymakers clearly
embraced most of the classic restrictionist ideals and goals of Lowell, the
IRL, and other nativists. This was particularly true of their ardent support
for Asian exclusion, literacy test legislation, and the rise of the national
origins quota system. Yet Arizona’s leadership also shared the free-market
conservatism of Carnegie, aggressively pursuing cheap, tractable labor to
meet the demands of its farming, mining, and ranching enterprises. New
Mexico’s ethnic and immigrant politics during these years also defy simple
characterization. Compared to Arizona’s system of racial subjugation, the
ethnic power sharing of New Mexican leaders and the defense of Hispano
and Mexican American political rights comes close to realizing many of
the key ideals of cosmopolitans like Addams and Kallen. Yet their uneasy
claims of national belonging, especially during depression and wartime,
fed restrictionist and protectionist tendencies in response to German and
Japanese immigrants.
Understanding the differing state responses to immigrants adds a vital,
often overlooked element to our understanding of American immigration
history. Federal government policies and national pressures mediated by
state governments and local communities have the capacity to create decidedly different experiences for immigrants depending on the specific places
where they live. While both Arizona and New Mexico put into place alien
land laws, for instance, the vigorous and violent enforcement in Arizona
against a range of immigrant groups was absent in New Mexico. Likewise,
the federal government’s efforts to encourage spying on one’s German neighbors during World War I was taken up with unmatched enthusiasm in New
Mexico. Today, as in the past, the American immigrant experience has been
shaped over time by not just who an immigrant is and when one arrives, but
also where one settles within the United States.
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